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Abstract 
 
Female labour force participation (hereinafter FLFP) trends across Eastern Europe, which 
were very high during communism, started to diverge substantially following its collapse. 
Women did not appear to benefit from the changing labour market conditions in those transi-
tion countries that pursued industrial upgrading as their strategy of economic development. 
On the other hand, in some small transition economies, most notably the Baltic countries, 
women benefited substantially from increased employment opportunities in the knowledge-
intensive public and private sector services. This article seeks to explain the observed varia-
tion in FLFP rates across the region by synthesising insights from macroeconomic and com-
parative political economy literature. It identifies four key relationships between industrial 
upgrading, educational expansion and the expansion of knowledge-intensive services and 
examines how these factors interacted and translated into specific FLFP outcomes. The article 
suggests that industrial upgrading, driven by foreign direct investment, created a vicious cy-
cle for FLFP. First of all, the upgrading led to a defeminisation of manufacturing because fe-
male labour-intensive sectors were not upgraded. Furthermore, the upgrading absorbed the 
budgetary resources that could have been used for educational reform and general skills for-
mation. This lack of educational reform impeded the development of knowledge-intensive 
services, which would have been more conducive to the generation of female employment. 
The virtuous cycle of FLFP, on the other hand, occurred in those Eastern European countries 
that turned to reforming their educational sector towards general skills and expansion of ter-
tiary education, with the aim of transforming themselves into knowledge economies. Such a 
transformation required an active social investment oriented state and an expansion of 
knowledge-intensive public and private sector employment. This development path created a 
positive causal loop for FLFP. I test these propositions quantitatively on a sample of 13 East-
ern European countries. 
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Vicious and virtuous cycles of female labour 
force participation in post-socialist Eastern 
Europe  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Eastern European countries had the highest female labour force participation 
(hereinafter FLFP) rates in the world during socialism and the region was 
characterised by professed equal treatment of women and full gender equali-
ty (Lobodzinska, 1995). Since the onset of post-socialist transition in 1989, 
FLFP trends across these countries have diverged. Some of the countries in 
the region experienced a temporary reversal of trends due to the negative 
shock of transition, following which FLFP rates recovered to their pre-
transition levels. For others, low FLFP became a more permanent feature of 
their economies. For example, Estonia and Latvia both had very high FLFP 
rate in 2010. The rate stood at 71.2% in both countries in 2010. In contrast, 
FLFP stood at 56.5% in Hungary and 50.5% in FYR Macedonia in the same 
year (see Graphs A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix).1 
Literature on Eastern Europe has not yet addressed this cross-country varia-
tion in FLFP trends. While economic studies have focused on smaller groups 
of geographically proximate countries, political economists who have com-
pared the different countries and sub-regions within Eastern Europe have not 
                                                   1 While the Baltic countries and the former Yugoslav Republic Slovenia saw growing economic re-activation of women during the 2000s, CEE countries were characterised by the persistently low FLFP at similar (or even higher) levels of economic development. Furthermore, while the FLFP trend in Bulgaria recovered during the 2000s, in similar fashion as in the Baltic countries and Slovenia, FLFP continued to fall in Romania. Female labour market outcomes also did not substantially improve in the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Macedonia as the transi-tion progressed, while some progress was made in Serbia. 
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yet included FLFP into their analyses (Feldmann, 2006; Nölke & Vliegenthart, 
2009; Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). 
Conventional wisdom has it that work-and-life balance and the policies that 
support it should determine FLFP outcomes. The economic argument is that 
market forces have affected women’s reservation wages2 in Eastern Europe 
through mechanisms such as the rising cost of childcare and higher husband 
wages and that this process has resulted in lower FLFP rates (e.g. Chase, 
1998). Nevertheless, the growing cost of childcare does not explain the ob-
served cross-country variation in FLFP outcomes across Eastern Europe, since 
childcare costs and wages grew across the region.  
In addition, looking at the relationship between FLFP and spending on child-
care in Eastern Europe, Mills et al. (2014) argue that “the level of childcare us-
age, enrolment and public investment is actually very low”, even though 
some of these countries have very high FLFP rates (p.42). Moreover, while Es-
tonia has one of the highest FLFP rates in the EU, EC recommendations re-
garding Estonia’s implementation of Europe 2020 emphasise access to child-
care as a particular problem (European Commission 2014; Official Journal, 
2014). In addition, Estonia stands out as the Eastern European country with 
the highest number of births per woman and the highest FLFP at the end of 
the observed period.3 Finally, there are no substantial differences in cultural 
attitudes towards female work among these countries that could account for 
the observed variation (Schnepf, 2006).  
In addition, a growing body of empirical evidence from across the world has 
begun to question the nature of the relationship between women’s work and 
their childbearing responsibilities. Billari & Kohler (2004) point towards a 
                                                   2 The lowest wage rate below which they would not be willing to work. 3 The variation in number of births per woman across the countries is not as high as the variation in FLFP. 
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changing relationship between fertility and female work in Europe, as fertility 
at lower numbers of births-per-woman stops being an impediment to female 
economic activation. McCall & Orloff (2005) remind us that earlier feminist ef-
forts to link social policy to female employment levels are being increasingly 
challenged by the growing emphasis on competitive demands in the new 
economy as the drivers of female employment (p.160). Humphries & Sarasúa 
(2012) argue that women have always historically worked when they have 
had the opportunity to do so, i.e. when jobs have been available. Fernández 
(2013) argues that cultural beliefs about women’s work and FLPF are in fact 
co-determined by wages and job opportunities. In other words, there is a 
growing emphasis on understanding how economic restructuring and the 
changes in labour demand that are associated with it shape FLFP.  
Nevertheless, there remain a number of unknowns. Macroeconomic literature 
does not specify the precise mechanisms through which economic restructur-
ing and the policies associated with it interact and translate into specific FLFP 
outcomes. For example, it is well recognised that public sector employment 
plays an important role in boosting women’s labour force participation 
(Psacharopoulos & Tzannatos, 1992; Gornick & Jacobs, 1998; Anghel, Rica & 
Dolado, 2011). At the same time, public sector employment as a determinant 
of FLFP is not conceptually integrated with economic studies that examine 
the positive impact of the expanding service economy on FLFP (Goldin, 1995; 
Gaddis & Klasen, 2014). Integration of these two accounts is important be-
cause the service economy has often expanded in parallel with public sector 
retrenchment.  
Moreover, macroeconomic literature is not clear about the impact of manufac-
turing on FLFP. Some studies point to the positive role that manufacturing 
has played in women’s employment in the developing world, despite the low 
skill, low wage foundation of such work (Gaddis & Pieters, 2012). Other em-
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pirical evidence indicates that industrial upgrading in manufacturing has led 
to women’s exit from the sector (Tejani & Milberg, 2016). Finally, while em-
ployment in the more complex industries as well as in the public sector re-
quires a workforce with higher educational attainment, the interaction be-
tween educational attainment and structural change, and its combined impact 
on FLFP, has not been examined.  
The comparative political economy (hereinafter CPE) literature on skill for-
mation, expansion of the service economy and social investment4, on the other 
hand, has thrown more light on the linkages between industrial upgrading, 
educational attainment and expansion of services, thus allowing me to devel-
op hypotheses about the relationships between these variables and FLFP in 
Eastern Europe.  
CPE literature has shown that countries produce the types of skills that com-
plement their production systems and that these skill regimes reproduce gen-
der biases. Estevez-Abe (2005) argues that specific skills regimes which are 
characteristic of countries that specialise in manufacturing have an adverse 
impact on women’s employment opportunities. On the other hand, general 
skills regimes, characteristic of countries that have a comparative advantage 
in high-tech and services, promote female employment.5 This is because turn-
over is costlier for employers who invest in firm-specific training, so interrup-
tions from work are not as desirable in a specific skills regime as in a general 
skills regime. Since women’s interruptions from work are more predictable 
than men’s, due to childbearing and family reasons, employers rationally dis-
                                                   4 Policies	designed	to	strengthen	people’s	skills	and	capacities	and	support	 them	to	participate	fully in employment and social life. Key policy areas include education, childcare, training, job-search assistance and rehabilitation. 5 Specific skills are acquired through on-the-job training (firm-specific) or through apprentice-ship and vocational schools (industry-specific). They are valuable to the employer / industry which carried out the training but not to other employers / sectors. General skills, gained through formal education from high schools and colleges, are recognised by all employers and carry a value that is independent of the type of firm or industry. 
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criminate against women in hiring, training, and promotion. In response to 
this discrimination, women do not have the incentive to invest in specific 
skills so they specialise in family work. In contrast, women’s incentives to 
work are higher in countries which specialise in services and which thrive on 
general skills, because labour market opportunities are more flexible rather 
than tied to entry and exit from a single firm or industry.   
Demand for female labour is also closely tied to the demands of the ‘new’ 
economy and the types of state policies associated with them. Thelen (2014) 
argues that a country’s focus on social investment oriented policies (e.g. pro-
vision of education and training for all kinds of people at all stages in life),6 
which is associated with Scandinavia and even the Netherlands, leads to both 
greater economic efficiency and reduction of gender inequality in the labour 
market. Furthermore, following the information and communication technol-
ogy (hereinafter ICT) revolution and productivity gains in the service econo-
my that stemmed from it, a new consensus is starting to emerge around the 
notion that women are benefiting from economic liberalisation and increased 
opportunities for employment in the expanding knowledge economy, be-
cause of the growing premium on communication and social skills (Wren, 
Fodor & Theodoropoulou, 2013; Nelson & Stephens 2013). 
I use these insights from the CPE literature on skills and the rise of the new 
economy in advanced capitalist economies to hypothesise the drivers of cross-
country variation in FLFP in Eastern Europe. According to Bohle & 
Greskovits (2012), Eastern European countries embarked on different trajecto-
ries of capitalist development – while some pursued industrial upgrading, 
others focused on the services sector oriented economic liberalisation. I also 
                                                   6 The focus of social investment policies is on the reduction of labour market vulnerability of in-
dividuals.	This	 is	achieved	through	 investment	 in	people’s	human	capital	 from	early	childhood	rather than through passive social insurance later in life. 
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hypothesise something that has not yet been discussed in the Eastern Europe-
an literature – that the services-oriented economic liberalisation trajectory, 
which was especially pronounced in the Baltic countries, has been 
knowledge-intensive and has gone hand-in-hand with the implementation of 
social investment policies, expansion of general skills and tertiary educational 
attainment, as well as higher public sector employment. 
In this context, I propose two stylised trajectories for FLFP in Eastern Europe 
– a vicious cycle – based on the pursuit of industrial upgrading and heavily 
supported by the government-led industrial policy, and a virtuous cycle – 
based on government-led social investment into education and development 
of knowledge-intensive services.  
The vicious cycle of FLFP unravels in the context of industrial upgrading driven 
by foreign direct investment (hereinafter FDI). First of all, the upgrading lead 
to a defeminisation of manufacturing because female labour-intensive sectors 
are not upgraded. Furthermore, the upgrading absorbs the budgetary re-
sources that could have been used for educational reform and general skill 
formation. This lack of educational reform impedes the development of 
knowledge-intensive services, which would have been more conducive to the 
generation of female employment.  
The virtuous cycle of FLFP, on the other hand, occurs in Eastern European 
countries that turn to reforming their educational sector towards general 
skills and expansion of tertiary education, with the aim of transforming them-
selves into knowledge economies. Such a transformation requires an active 
social investment state and growth of knowledge-intensive public and private 
sector employment, which provides greater employment opportunities for 
women.  
The structure of the article is the following. The next section presents my the-
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oretical framework on the drivers of FLFP in Eastern Europe, depicts the rela-
tionships between the variables and traces the hypothesised causal mecha-
nisms. Section 3 presents the results of the econometric analyses which test 
the relationships depicted in section 2, while section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Relationships between the variables 
This section brings together the proposed relationships between FLFP ( L), 
industrial upgrading ( K), educational expansion ( E) and knowledge-
intensive services ( S). The theorised relationships are summarised into equa-
tions and then illustrated in the 4-quadrant diagram, which is presented in 
Figure 1 in section 2.2 below.  
The hypothesised relationships between the four variables can be expressed 
in the following four equations: 
(1) L = f1( K, ) 
(2) L = f2( S, ) 
(3) E = g( K, ) 
(4) S = h( E, ) 
, ,  and  are the exogenous variables affecting these relationships. They 
are discussed in Table A-1 in the Appendix.  
Equation (1) depicts FLFP as a function of industrial upgrading K. The rela-
tionship between industrial upgrading and FLFP is based on insights from 
Vicious and virtuous cycles of female labour force participation 
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Tejani & Milberg (2016) and the history of occupational segregation within 
manufacturing in Eastern Europe during socialism (Lobodzinska, 1995). Fol-
lowing this literature, I hypothesise that FLFP and industrial upgrading are 
inversely related. The more industrial upgrading takes place, the fewer wom-
en participate in the labour market, ceteris paribus. This is because industrial 
upgrading has been shown to have a negative impact on female employment 
in manufacturing in Southeast Asia and in Latin America (Ghosh, 2001; Tejani 
& Milberg, 2016). While female employment was high during socialism in 
light labour-intensive industrial sectors, I hypothesise that those Eastern Eu-
ropean countries that followed the industrial upgrading trajectory have dis-
mantled a significant share of light female-labour oriented manufacturing, 
which has led to the defeminisation of manufacturing labour. A second 
mechanism through which female manufacturing employees could have lost 
out from industrial upgrading is that women held many auxiliary non-
production jobs in manufacturing companies and these positions could have 
been cut or outsourced in the process of privatisation and company restruc-
turing (Lobodzinska, 1995).  
While both of these mechanisms could have simultaneously affected the rela-
tionship in the same direction, there are strong indications that occupational 
segregation has been the main driver of defeminisation of manufacturing in 
Eastern Europe. This is because gender-based segregation by sectors of em-
ployment has been pervasive across the world historically (Bettio & Verash-
chagina, 2009, p.7) and because industrial sectors where female employment 
is pervasive are textile, footwear and leather (ILO, 2014). Communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe, although known for their high engagement of women 
in industrial employment, have not been immune to this gender segregation 
in the sectoral distribution of labour (Lobodzinska, 1995, p. 23).  
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It is also plausible to hypothesise a positive relationship between FLFP and 
industrial upgrading, based on the ‘nimble fingers’ hypothesis (Elson & 
Pearson, 1981) and the vast amount of empirical work that has stemmed from 
it, particularly from Asia. Nevertheless, as Ghosh (2001) points out, prolifera-
tion of female employment in manufacturing across the developing world 
during the period 1980-1995 was dependent on relative inferiority of remu-
neration and working conditions for women. As soon as wages and condi-
tions started to improve and the manufacturing became more complex, capi-
tal and skill intensive, women across Asia stopped benefiting from employ-
ment in these sectors.  
Therefore, given the initial levels of manufacturing complexity, skill intensity 
and income levels in Eastern Europe, which were higher than in East and 
Southeast Asia even during the early stages of transition, I posit that the type 
of industries that expanded via industrial upgrading in Eastern Europe were 
not the female labour-intensive ones and that women lost out from these pro-
cesses in the region. In other words, over a larger range of industrial upgrad-
ing scenarios, the relationship between industrial upgrading and FLFP can be 
thought of as inverse U-shaped – women benefit from industrial upgrading in 
the beginning, until complexity and wages reach a level where defeminisation 
begins.  
Equation (2) depicts FLFP as a function of knowledge-intensive services, 
where the relationship between the two variables is positive. 7 The hypothe-
sised direction of this relationship is based on numerous evidence on how the 
knowledge economy and the expan sion of high productivity service em-
ployment has boosted female employment across the western world (Rubery, 
2009; Walby, 2011; Nelson & Stephens 2013; Thelen, 2014). The knowledge-
                                                   7 For a discussion of the exogenous variables  that are affecting this relationship, see Table A-1 in the Appendix. 
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intensive services include both private and public sector jobs, because public 
investment in people’s skills and capacities has been shown to stimulate the 
development of the knowledge economy (Wren, Fodor & Theodoropoulou, 
2013; Thelen, 2014). Low skill services are not included in this equation be-
cause the focus of the most recent CPE literature has been on the emergence 
of the knowledge economy which, due to the ICT revolution and tertiary edu-
cational expansion, has generated the majority of new service employment 
(Wren, Fodor & Theodoropoulou, 2013).  
Equation (3) depicts educational expansion, defined as a shift away from in-
dustry or firm specific towards general skills, as a function of industrial up-
grading and other exogenous variables  (see Table A-1 in the Appendix). I 
hypothesise that the relationship between industrial upgrading and educa-
tional expansion is inverse so that the demand for specific skills in those East-
ern European countries that have pursued industrial upgrading is higher than 
the demand for general skills and vice versa. This hypothesis is based on in-
sights from the CPE literature on skill formation. In this literature, Central 
and Eastern Europe8 (hereinafter CEE) is perceived as having a comparative 
advantage in the production of complex goods because of their skilled but 
cheap manufacturing labour (Nölke & Vliegenthart, 2009). Furthermore, be-
cause multinational companies (hereinafter MNCs) have been the main 
source of innovation in CEE where domestic innovative activity is low, empir-
ical evidence from the region indicates that these severely fiscally constrained 
governments9 have not prioritised investment in general-skills oriented ter-
tiary education nor in research and development (Nölke & Vliegenthart, 
2009).  
                                                   8 Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 9 These governments are fiscally constrained because of the substantial expenditure on subsidies in order to attract FDI and significant social and political pressure to compensate losers of transi-tion, coupled with strict fiscal discipline imposed on them by the EU. 
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While I propose a negative linear impact of industrial upgrading on educa-
tional expansion, a U-shaped relationship between the two variables can also 
be conceived. As countries use their resources to attract FDI, educational ex-
pansion is not a top policy concern. But as the complexity of the country’s 
production processes grow and it moves towards higher VA manufacturing, 
these industries may start demanding a greater number of specialised higher 
education graduates. This may lead to the expansion of higher education even 
in a fiscally constrained country, as private providers enter the market in re-
sponse to these new labour market demands. Nevertheless, such expansion of 
specialised higher education is conceptually different from the state-led ex-
pansion of general skills oriented higher education. 
On the other side of the spectrum, I hypothesise that government-driven ex-
pansion of general skills and tertiary education was an alternative develop-
ment strategy to industrial upgrading and would have taken place in those 
countries that did not benefit from industrial upgrading. This argument is 
based on insights from Bohle & Greskovits (2012), who argue that the Baltic 
states pursued general skill educational expansion as an alternative to indus-
trial upgrading.  
Equation (4) shows that knowledge-intensive services,10 which include highly 
skilled service jobs in the public and the private sector, are a function of edu-
cational reform and other exogenous variables  (see Table A-1 in the Ap-
pendix). The proposed relationship is based on the following logic: educa-
tional expansion leads to more public and private sector knowledge-intensive 
service employment. In the public sector, we can expect that employment in 
                                                   10 The following economic activity sectors are defined as knowledge intensive services: i) high-tech knowledge-intensive services (e.g. programming, telecommunications, scientific research and development and consultancy), ii) knowledge-intensive market services excluding financial intermediation and high-tech services (such as transport, legal and accounting services, advertis-ing and market research), iii) knowledge-intensive financial services and iv) other knowledge-intensive services (such as publishing, public administration, education and health) (NACE Rev.2 codes - 2-digit level between brackets). The complete list can be found in Appendix A.3.1. 
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educational institutions as well as a stronger social investment state is the re-
sult of a greater amount of public resources devoted to educational expan-
sion. While a traditional welfare state relies on passive cash payments, the so-
cial investment state, though it is less expensive in terms of total expenditure, 
relies on more public employment to provide services that support educa-
tional expansion. We know from literature that public sector employment 
disproportionately benefits women (Anghel, Rica & Dolado, 2011; Ansell & 
Gingrich, 2013). Recent empirical evidence relating to private sector employ-
ment shows that public investment in educational expansion, social invest-
ment and R&D leads to the expansion of both public and private sector 
knowledge-intensive service jobs, while absence of investment produces only 
new low skill low wage service jobs (Nelson & Stephens, 2011; Nelson & 
Stephens, 2013; Thelen, 2014).  
Mellander & Florida (2012) draw our attention to the possibility of reverse 
causality between these two variables by arguing that the existence of firms 
that require ‘knowledge workers’ could be driving skill formation in a coun-
try (p.4). Nevertheless, in the case of post-socialist Eastern Europe, Bohle & 
Greskovits (2012) emphasise initial government efforts to attract foreign in-
vestors – investment in educational expansion in the case of the Baltic states 
and industrial subsidies to upgrade its industry in the case of CEE. Further-
more, Mellander & Florida (2012) conclude that this is a classic case of interac-
tion between the demand for skills and their supply which can never be fully 
resolved theoretically or empirically. Therefore, they argue, the dynamics be-
tween educational supply and the knowledge economy should not be ana-
lysed as a chicken and egg question. It is a lot more important to understand 
how these two phenomena interact to produce public and private sector 
knowledge-intensive service jobs and how that translates into economic 
growth (p.4-5).  
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Given these insights, the model proposes a sequential relationship, where ed-
ucational expansion leads to the expansion of knowledge-intensive services, 
which in turn positively affects FLFP (as specified in Equation 2). Neverthe-
less, I empirically test these relationships by treating educational expansion as 
an intervening variable that determines the extent to which knowledge-
intensive services contribute to FLFP. This is because I acknowledge the com-
plex causality between these two variables, which is difficult to reduce to lin-
ear one-way relationships.  
 
2.2 The causal mechanisms 
The diagram presented in Figure 1 below depicts the discussed relationships 
between FLFP ( L), industrial upgrading ( K), educational expansion ( E) 
and knowledge-intensive services ( S). This is a stylised model so the direc-
tion of the depicted relationships is more important than their magnitude. 
The negative causal mechanism that the model depicts is as follows: Initially, 
while a country’s competitive advantage lies in light, labour-intensive manu-
facturing such as textiles, women benefit from manufacturing employment. 
Starting in the NE quadrant of Figure 1, a movement down the f1 curve takes 
place and industrial upgrading increases from K0 to K1. This affects FLFP neg-
atively so it decreases from L0 to L1. This event, ceteris paribus, produces an 
upward movement along the g curve, depicted in the SE quadrant, so that E0 
shifts to E1. The way this shift should be interpreted is that educational reform 
towards general skills loses support and there is disproportionately more 
demand for vocational education and specific skills. This shift from E0 to E1 
leads to an upward movement along the h curve so that knowledge-intensive 
services are reduced from S0 to S1.  
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Figure 1. Model of female labour force participation, industrial upgrading 
and service transition 
 
The mechanism whereby there is a reduction in knowledge-intensive services 
is as follows: At any given level of educational attainment, there is a certain 
level of knowledge-intensive services. If a country wants to stimulate 
knowledge-intensive services, it has to invest more in educational expansion. 
However, as industrial upgrading takes place, there is both more demand for 
specific skills and fewer resources for educational expansion, so the develop-
ment of the knowledge economy stalls while manufacturing jobs become rela-
tively more attractive. This negative loop results in an even lower new equi-
librium for L. Women do not react to these employment losses politically be-
cause collective action is very hard to organise for the unemployed, so women 
become even further socially marginalised.  
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The positive causal mechanism operates as follows: Stagnation of industrial 
complexity (or absence of industrial upgrading) puts pressure on the coun-
try’s economic growth model, so it starts with educational expansion to boost 
its economy. This is depicted as an outward shift of g to g’ in the SE quadrant, 
which occurs due to the exogenous impact of new government spending on 
education. This shift results in E0 increasing to E2. This, in turn, increases the 
level of S0 to S2 as knowledge-intensive services expand which raises L0 to L2 as 
FLFP expands. Such expansion of FLFP results in the outwards shift of f1 to f1’ 
because the relationship between FLFP and industrial upgrading is redefined 
once a larger share of those employed work in the service economy, since 
now at any level of industrial upgrading FLFP will be higher. f1’ is also less 
elastic because the link between women’s position in the labour market and 
industrial upgrading is weakened, as the service economy expands and there 
are more employment opportunities outside manufacturing. Finally, since 
manufacturing has not been upgraded, low-skilled women continue to benefit 
from employment in light industry.  
These two stylised causal mechanisms show how a self-reinforcing vicious or 
virtuous cycle of gender equality in labour market opportunities can develop 
in a country depending on whether its development trajectory is oriented to-
wards industrial upgrading or knowledge-intensive services. They are posit-
ed as mutually exclusive, following the axiomatic logic of CPE literature on 
capitalist diversity in Eastern Europe (Feldmann, 2006; Nölke & Vliegenthart, 
2009; Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). I am assuming that a country that is follow-
ing the path of industrial upgrading cannot concurrently pursue the devel-
opment of the knowledge economy and vice versa. Institutional complemen-
tarities that support the development of one trajectory develop, which are fur-
ther reinforced by the Eastern European post-socialist context of tight budget-
Vicious and virtuous cycles of female labour force participation 
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ary restraint and dependence on foreign capital, reduce the agency of domes-
tic actors and make them strongly path dependent. 
While I argue that the implementation of concurrent trajectories of re-
industrialisation and knowledge economy development were not possible in 
the specific context of Eastern European transition, there may be a possibility 
for convergence between the two development trajectories in the longer run. 
The story of capitalist development in Eastern Europe would, in that case, be-
come a story about the best way of sequencing re-industrialisation vs 
knowledge economy oriented economic reforms and the socio-economic out-
comes, such as levels of FLFP, that are associated with them, rather than the 
question of choosing one path vs the other. 
 
 
3. Testing the theoretical framework 
The empirical robustness of the model is tested on a sample of 13 Eastern Eu-
ropean countries during the period 1997-2008. I use several econometric spec-
ifications in order to test the following relationships them stem from the 
model:  
i) industrial upgrading and FLFP, represented in the NE quadrant of 
Figure 1;  
ii) industrial upgrading and educational expansion, represented in the 
SE quadrant of Figure 1;  
iii) knowledge-intensive services and FLFP, represented in the NW 
quadrant of Figure 1;  
iv) knowledge-intensive services and educational expansion, repre-
sented in the SW quadrant of Figure 1.  
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The relationship between knowledge-intensive services and educational ex-
pansion is analysed as an extension of the analysis on the relationship be-
tween knowledge-intensive services and FLFP, because my framework posits 
that educational expansion is the intervening variable that affects the extent to 
which knowledge-intensive services contribute to FLFP. 
 
3.1 Data, variables and method 
In order to test the four sets of relationships presented in Figure 1, I use Euro-
stat’s data on FLFP and employment by sectors of economic activity dis-
aggregated by gender, which is based on household level Labour Force Sur-
veys (hereinafter LFS) from the respective countries. Summary statistics on 
the variables used in this analysis are shown in Table A-3 in the Appendix. 
For most countries in my sample an uninterrupted time series of employment 
by sector of economic activity is available for the maximum period from 1997 
to 2008. The break in Eurostat’s NACE classification of economic activities11 
came in 2008, the year when the Great Recession began. Nevertheless, this is 
not an issue for the empirical analysis because the complex effect of the crisis 
on the labour markets will not confounded with the ‘transitional’ causal 
mechanisms posited in the theoretical framework.12 Additionally, LFS data is 
more reliable after 2000 because, by then, Eastern European countries in my 
sample had fully synchronised their datasets with EU standards.   
Based on this Eurostat definition of sectors that are classified as knowledge-
intensive services (see Table A-2 in the Appendix), I create an aggregate esti-
mate of employment in knowledge-intensive services, which include all pub-
                                                   11 The acronym is derived from the French Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques 
dans la Communauté européenne. 12 The drawback of using sectoral employment data before 2007 is that the reclassification of NACE activities came only during 2007-8. Therefore, I am not able to separate knowledge-intensive sectors from the rest of the service economy as precisely as it would have been desira-ble. 
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lic services (public administration, education, health and social services) as 
well as high productivity private services, such as financial intermediation, 
real estate and transportation services. In addition, because knowledge-
intensive services are expected to have a higher value added (hereinafter VA) 
than other services, I include the share of services in VA (percentage of GDP) 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database as 
an alternative measure of the size of the knowledge-intensive service econo-
my. Furthermore, following Eurostat’s definition and insights from CPE liter-
ature, I account for both public and private sector components of knowledge-
intensive services and analyse them both together and separately.  
Because of the variation in employment-to-population ratios across the coun-
tries in my sample, I include a measure of the share of employees in a specific 
sector as a share of the total working age population, in addition to their share 
in total employment. This is because two countries can have identical shares 
of employees in manufacturing out of all employees, but when the overall 
employment-to-population ratio is much lower in one country, that indicator 
hides the fact that a significantly lower portion of working age people work in 
manufacturing in that country. I calculate these ‘share of the working age 
population’ indicators for the different sectors by dividing the number of em-
ployees in a sector with the total working age population (or the number of 
female employees in a sector with the total number of working age women). 
The additional benefit of including this alternative specification of the varia-
bles is that it accounts for the full variation in gender gaps in labour force par-
ticipation, which are not always fully compatible with the variation in FLFP. 
As a measure of industrial upgrading, I choose the Economic Complexity In-
dex (hereinafter ECI) constructed by Hausmann et al. (2011). The basis for ECI 
is the quantity and complexity of exported goods and the frequency of ex-
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ports. Services and non-export goods are not included in the index.13 Fur-
thermore, this index was developed because of the inadequacy of existing 
measures to capture the different components of industrial upgrading and it 
has already been used in its current format in econometric models which es-
timate structural change and economic growth (Hausmann et al., 2011).  
When it comes to educational expansion, there is no agreement in the litera-
ture on how to measure the bias towards general or specific skills in an econ-
omy. A vast array of indicators have been used to determine a country’s skill 
regime while the human capital literature has focused on the quantification of 
educational attainment (see Martinaitis, 2010 for overview). Because specific 
skills are associated with vocational training while general skills are associat-
ed with tertiary education, using measures such as the share of the total 
population as well as the share of women with tertiary educational attain-
ment can also act as approximations of general skills education. Furthermore, 
Nelson & Stephens (2011) measure social investment in education by levels of 
tertiary educational attainment and educational expenditures. This is also 
why I use the term ‘educational expansion’ although I am also referring to the 
movement towards general skills education. I also analyse the share of spend-
ing on education as a percentage of GDP because I assume that Eastern Euro-
pean countries which inherited specific skill regimes from communism had to 
invest more in their education in order to re-direct their educational systems 
towards general skill regimes. All the data on educational trends are obtained 
from Eurostat.  
The econometric analyses of the relationships posited in the model are con-
ducted on a time-series cross-section (hereinafter TSCS) dataset. I run the or-
                                                   13 While ECI is highly correlated with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data on the skill content of exports, it aggregates the low vs medium vs high skill components of such data into one non-monetary measure, which combines the total value of ex-ports with their content. 
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dinary least squares (hereinafter OLS) estimates with panel-corrected stand-
ard errors (hereinafter PCSE), following Beck & Katz (1995). The PCSE OLS is 
the most robust OLS estimator for panel data and it measures the relationship 
between the variables by taking into consideration both cross-country and 
over time variation. I also include the OLS estimates with fixed effects (here-
inafter FE), which assess the variation within individual countries only, by 
controlling for time invariant country specific effects. I am interested in both 
cross-country and within country trends because my argument posits diverg-
ing trajectories across the countries in my sample. Additionally, my sample of 
13 countries over the time span of 10 or less years is rather small, so variation 
within individual countries may not be sufficient to produce meaningful 
within country estimates.  
While explaining diverse empirical outcomes across only 13 Eastern Europe-
an countries makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions from econometric 
analyses alone, exploring a limited range of cases is particularly relevant for 
the CPE scholarly community, because its members are interested in being 
able to compare country cases rather than analyse average cross-country ef-
fects (Shalev 2007, p.264). In fact, Shalev (2007) argues that by keeping the 
cases visible the researcher is directly catering to the needs of CPE research-
ers. 
 
3.2 Industrial upgrading and defeminisation of manufacturing           
employment 
H1: Industrial upgrading leads to defeminisation of manufacturing. 
H2: Industrial upgrading has a negative impact on FLFP. 
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According to my theoretical framework, industrial upgrading affects FLFP 
both directly and indirectly. Directly, it leads to the defeminisation of manu-
facturing which, ceteris paribus, reduces the share of women in industrial la-
bour. In practice, the net loss of female jobs in manufacturing will depend on 
whether defeminisation is taking place at a faster pace than the creation of 
new jobs in manufacturing, particularly during the initial stages. Neverthe-
less, I expect that the more complex the manufacturing, the more technology 
intensive it becomes and the less new jobs are created in the sector, so the 
negative effect of defeminisation on female labour prevails in the longer run.  
The proposed indirect effect that industrial upgrading has on FLFP in my 
model is based on the following line of reasoning that was presented in sec-
tion 2: industrial policies such as company subsidies which were pursued by 
countries aiming to attract industrial FDI, global tax competition (Appel, 
2011) and political pressures to compensate losers from these processes 
(Vanhuysse, 2006), created fiscal constraints which had to be contained due to 
pressures for macroeconomic stability from the EU (Appel, 2011; Bohle & 
Greskovits, 2012). Such circumstances did not allow for educational expan-
sion towards general skills, which would have increased occupational mobili-
ty of labour towards the knowledge economy, or expansion of public em-
ployment, which would have favoured women.  
In order to test H1, I estimate two specifications for each of the following 
econometric models: 
DFEMSHAREit = 0 + 1ECIit + 2X’it + it         (1) 
DFEMSHAREit = 0 + 1ECIit + 2ECI2it + 3X’it + it       (2) 
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where DFEMSHAREit is a measure of feminisation of manufacturing em-
ployment in country i in year t.14 ECIit is a measure of industrial upgrading in 
country i in year t, while ECI2it represents its squared form. I include the 
squared form of the main independent variable to check for the possibility of 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between the level of economic complexity 
and women’s employment in manufacturing. Xit is the vector of control varia-
bles, the error term is represented by it and the betas are the parameters to be 
estimated. When using the FE estimator, a t term, which represents time-
specific fixed effects, is also added to the equations. 
Following econometric standards, I include GDP per capita as a control varia-
ble. GDP per capita has a correlation coefficient of 0.75 at 1% significance with 
the level of economic complexity. This relatively high level of correlation be-
tween the two variables may result in multicollinearity, where GDP per capita 
takes away some of the predictive power of my independent variable. There-
fore, I show the results of my estimates with and without this control. Some of 
the other possible variables that would affect the proposed relationship, such 
as occupational segregation, are not available for these countries in a time se-
ries format so I do not include them. Nevertheless, by including FE in my 
econometric specifications, I control for all country-specific characteristics that 
do not vary over time. The caveat of my FE estimates, however, is that the 
small sample size may not allow for enough variation within the countries to 
produce significant estimates. 
The PCSE OLS estimates indicate a linear negative effect of industrial upgrad-
ing on the share of women in manufacturing, which is preserved even when 
the quadratic specification of the independent variable is included, as well as 
when GDP per capita is included (see Table A-4 in the Appendix). R2 is also 
                                                   14 D is the letter used for manufacturing in Eurostat’s	NACE	classification. 
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substantial which indicates that this model has substantial explanatory power 
even without the inclusion of the additional variables. This result confirms H1 
by indicating that both across the countries and over time, increases in eco-
nomic complexity have led to the defeminisation of manufacturing. 
On the other hand, the explanatory power of the FE model is significantly in-
creased when I include the quadratic term of the independent variable, and 
even further when GDP per capita is included. The FE estimates therefore in-
dicate an inverse U-shaped relationship between the level of economic com-
plexity and the share of women in manufacturing within countries. This in-
verse U shape also supports the findings from PCSE OLS that industrial up-
grading in the longer run leads to defeminisation of manufacturing. There-
fore, the FE estimator also confirms H1. 
 
Graph 1. Predicted values of female share in manufacturing: FE using LSDV 
with fitted values from the OLS regression 
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The results of the econometric estimates from Table A-4 that can be found in 
the Appendix are visualised in Graph 1 I run the FE estimates from model 615 
using the least squares dummy variable estimator (hereinafter LSDV) in order 
to produce the graph. This is an alternative method to run the FE regression, 
which produces identical results as the OLS. It allows the generation of specif-
ic coefficients for each country, which can then be compared visually. While 
the within country estimates suggest slight inverse U-shaped trajectories, 
cross-country estimates indicate a linear downward sloping trajectory of fe-
male share in manufacturing over the growth in economic complexity, which 
is especially pronounced in CEE and in Slovenia. This empirical analysis of-
fers robust evidence that industrial upgrading negatively impacts the share of 
women in manufacturing, leading to the sector’s defeminisation. Therefore, I 
confirm H1. 
Nevertheless, the main purpose of my theoretical framework is to analyse the 
extent to which these structural shifts within manufacturing affect overall 
FLFP rates. I therefore estimate the following econometric models in order to 
test H2: 
FLFPit = 0i + 1ECIit + 2X’it + it                      (3) 
FLFPit =  0i + 1ECIit + 2ECI2it + 3X’it + it         (4) 
where FLFPit, is a measure of FLFP in country i in year t, while the other  
terms are as specified in the previous two equations.  
Apart from GDP per capita as the control variable, I also include the share of 
knowledge-intensive service employment in the total working age population 
as a determinant of FLFP rates. This is because it is a large sector, which ac-
                                                   15 Because coefficients in model 2 are not significant. 
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cording to my theoretical model exercises a significant influence on FLFP 
rates.  
Table 1 shows the results of the linear estimates for the entire sample of coun-
tries. While the first PCSE model, which does not include the control varia-
bles, suggests a positive relationship between the level of economic complexi-
ty and FLFP, the inclusion of the control variables results in the tracing of a 
negative relationship between FLFP and the level of economic complexity in 
the PCSE OLS models. 
 
Table 1. Economic complexity and FLFP (15-64): econometric estimates, all 
countries 1997-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE 
Economic  
complex 
3.306 3.156 -1.935 0.231 -3.894 0.613 
(6.77)*** (2.57)** (5.41)*** (0.13) (4.52)*** (0.35) 
KIS pop 
  0.743 0.340 0.628 0.601 
  (9.57)*** (2.19)** (8.05)*** (2.31)** 
GDP pc 
    0.559 -0.519 
    (4.70)*** (1.25) 
_cons 
57.439 57.567 46.540 53.455 48.022 49.990 
(113.40)*** (54.44)*** (26.02)*** (19.39)*** (26.93)*** (12.81)*** 
R2 0.08 0.05 0.35 0.07 0.38 0.09 
N 146 146 120 120 120 120 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The estimates with FEs, on the other hand, lose all significance when control 
variables are included. This is a disappointing result, but the caveat of my FE 
estimates is the short time series, which may not allow for enough variation in 
both economic complexity and the control variables within the countries that 
could lead to significant estimates. However, the estimations indicate a signif-
icant positive effect of knowledge-intensive service employment on FLFP, 
both across and within the countries, which is in line with my theoretical 
model. In fact, because of the concurrent effects of knowledge-intensive ser-
vice employment and economic complexity on FLFP, knowledge-intensive 
Vicious and virtuous cycles of female labour force participation 
26 
 
service employment as a control variable may be absorbing a portion of the 
effect of economic complexity on FLFP within the countries. This is possible 
due to the indirect effect of industrial upgrading on FLFP, where industrial 
upgrading has a negative impact on educational expansion and consequently 
on knowledge-intensive services. The positive coefficient for the effect of 
knowledge-intensive service employment on FLFP indicates that the slower 
expansion of knowledge-intensive services, which I argue is caused by indus-
trial upgrading, may be impeding the growth of FLFP. 
Finally, estimates of the model with the quadratic specification of the level of 
economic complexity are not included, because none of the coefficients are 
significant. This indicates that there is no quadratic relationship between eco-
nomic complexity and FLFP across or within the countries in my sample. 
In summary, cross-country evidence on the negative impact of industrial up-
grading on FLFP generates substantial evidence in favour of H2. Neverthe-
less, due to the weaker within country evidence that stems from this analysis, 
in the subsequent sections I examine the relationships between industrial up-
grading and educational expansion, as well as between educational expansion 
and the effect of knowledge-intensive services on FLFP. This is in order to de-
termine whether industrial upgrading could also be exercising its indirect ef-
fect on FLFP through that causal mechanism. Showing the presence of that 
additional causal mechanism would strengthen the conclusion from this sec-
tion that industrial upgrading impedes the growth of overall FLFP, and not 
only female employment in manufacturing. 
 
3.3 Industrial upgrading and educational expansion 
H3: Industrial upgrading inhibits educational expansion.  
  Sonja Avlijas 
 
27 
 
In order to test H3 econometrically, I estimate two specifications for each of 
the following models: 
EDUit = 0 + 1ECIit + 2X’it + it        (5) 
EDUit = 0 + 1ECIit + 2ECI2it + 3X’it + it       (6) 
where EDUit is a measure of educational expansion in country i in year t, 
while the other variables are the same as specified in the previous section. I 
specify educational expansion as the share of population with tertiary educa-
tional attainment, and alternatively, as expenditure on education as a share of 
GDP.  
I also use the alternative specification of the dependent variable – expendi-
tures on education as a share of GDP – assuming that countries that pursue 
educational expansion have to invest in their educational systems. Neverthe-
less, Castelló-Climent & Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2010) warn of the difficulty of 
drawing conclusions from data on educational expenditures, because such 
numbers suffer from substantial interpretational problems. For example, it is 
difficult to measure private investment in education. Countries also vary ac-
cording to their demographics, so countries that educate more usually spend 
less on a per capita basis. Therefore, I do not include a measure of spending 
per student in my analysis and I take the results from the analysis of educa-
tional expenditures as a share of GDP with a grain of salt.  
When it comes to economic complexity, I include the squared form of ECI be-
cause I want to check for the possibility of a U-shaped relationship between 
economic complexity and educational expansion. This is in line with the ex-
pectations of the macroeconomic human capital literature (Castelló-Climent & 
Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2010), which argues that expansion of tertiary education 
may be a ‘natural’ effect of economic development. In other words, I posit 
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that countries may reach a level of economic development via industrial up-
grading at which: i) they can afford more investment in education than was 
the case in the earlier stages of re-industrialisation which was characterised 
by budgetary restraint; and/or ii) the growing demand for tertiary education 
as the economy becomes more complex would create a private supply of edu-
cation. In fact, a recent PhD thesis by Tarlea (2015) indicates the presence of 
the latter mechanism in CEE. She shows that over the last few years, demand 
for tertiary education in CEE has risen because of growing MNC skill needs. 
This has led to the proliferation of private higher education in the region, alt-
hough the rates of tertiary educational attainment still remain at significantly 
lower levels than in the Baltic.  
Reflecting on these trends is an important step in our understanding of future 
trajectories of the knowledge economy in Eastern Europe. This is particularly 
the case since Ansell & Gingrich (2013) show that in the advanced capitalist 
economies partly private education systems lead to the generation of different 
types of knowledge-intensive service jobs (e.g. in finance and real estate) than 
the government-led educational expansion (e.g. public sector services such as 
health and education). While the data constraints in the empirical analysis 
conducted here do not allow us to distinguish between the different types of 
higher education financing structures, I will return to this matter in the sec-
tion 3.5 where I assess how educational expansion affects the relative contri-
bution of public vs private sector knowledge-intensive service employment to 
overall FLFP.  
I include GDP per capita as the standard control variable that I include in all 
specifications, along with the same caveats from the previous section. Due to 
possible multicollinearity between ECI and GDP per capita, this control vari-
able may be reducing the effect of ECI on educational expansion. Therefore, I 
show the results with and without GDP per capita. The other variables that 
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might affect this relationship and are fiscal constraints, institutional and polit-
ical constraints to reform and the extent of dependence on foreign capital. All 
of them will be covered in the FE estimations, because this estimation tech-
nique controls for time invariant country level effects. 16 Finally, because I 
propose a negative effect of industrial upgrading on educational expansion, 
reverse causality is not a concern, as it is difficult to theoretically posit why 
more tertiary educational expansion would lead to less industrial upgrading.  
Results of the econometric estimates of the impact of industrial upgrading on 
the share of population with tertiary education are shown in Table A-5 in the 
Appendix. The linear specification of the independent variable indicates a 
negative impact of economic complexity on tertiary educational attainment, 
significant at 1%, both for with and without FEs. The quadratic specification 
of ECI preserves the linear and negative PCSE OLS results, while the FE est i-
mates show a U-shaped impact of economic complexity on tertiary education 
within the countries in my sample.  
The differences between estimates with and without FEs using the LSDV es-
timation technique are shown in Graph 2. While the graph shows a clear 
downward sloping relationship between economic complexity and tertiary 
educational attainment across the countries in my sample, the within country 
U-shaped relationship is the result of growth of tertiary education in the 
countries with the highest levels of economic complexity. This is, however, 
taking place from significantly lower levels of educational attainment than in 
the Baltic countries and Bulgaria.17  
                                                   16 Fiscal constraints are not necessarily time invariant, but they have been persistent in many Eastern European countries throughout the 2000s. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, I consider them time invariant. 17 While Graph 2 appears to show that the level of tertiary education has not grown in the Baltic countries during transition, it in fact indicates predicted values of the variable over economic complexity. There has been substantial growth of tertiary education in the Baltic countries over the period of observation. 
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Graph 2. Predicted values of population with tertiary education: FE using 
LSDV with fitted values from the OLS regression 
 
 
Graph 2 further indicates that the within country U-shaped relationship be-
tween industrial upgrading and growth of tertiary education is driven by 
Slovenia and CEE. While Slovenia has been a persistent outlier,18 the case of 
CEE could be explained by findings from Tarlea (2015), who shows that 
MNCs have shaped the demand for higher education and its supply through 
private institutions in CEE during the later stages of transition. The fact that 
these countries did not see a substantial increase in female entry in their la-
bour markets indicates that, following Ansell & Gingrich (2013), privately 
supplied education may not have as positive an impact on FLFP as public. 
While more research should be conducted in order for us to fully understand 
the mechanisms at play here, I find this empirical evidence compelling 
enough to support H3, with the caveat that industrial upgrading may impede 
                                                   18 Because of its higher level of economic development than the rest of the countries in the sam-ple, as well as its low dependence on foreign capital and lower fiscal constraints than the rest of Eastern Europe. 
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government-led educational expansion rather than both public and private 
educational expansion (as discussed in section 2.1). 
Results from the estimates on the effect of industrial upgrading on education-
al expenditures as a share of GDP are shown in Table A-6 in the Appendix. 
The PCSE OLS evidence also supports my hypothesis about the negative im-
pact of industrial upgrading on educational expenditures. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the quadratic term in the FE estimates indicates a U-shaped rela-
tionship between the two variables. This U-shaped relationship is expected 
because the measure of educational expansion that I use does not distinguish 
between private and public provision of higher education, or between special-
ised and general skills oriented higher education. Therefore, imprecise meas-
urement of educational expansion and movement towards general skills is an 
important limitation of this econometric analysis. 
 
3.4 Knowledge-intensive services and feminisation of service                  
employment 
H4: Growth of knowledge-intensive services leads to higher FLFP rates. 
H5: The higher the share of knowledge-intensive service employment in the economy, 
the higher the share of women in knowledge-intensive services. 
H6: Growth of public sector employment leads to higher FLFP. 
In section 3.2, where I included knowledge-intensive services as a control var-
iable in the econometric analysis of the impact of industrial upgrading on 
FLFP, I show that the share of the total working age population employed in 
knowledge-intensive services positively affects FLFP in Eastern Europe, both 
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across and within the countries over time (see Table 1 in section 3.2). This 
finding already strongly confirms H4.  
Apart from this positive effect of knowledge-intensive service employment on 
FLFP, I am interested in understanding whether women have disproportion-
ately benefited from greater expansion of knowledge-intensive services, i.e. 
whether knowledge-intensive services have absorbed women and men at the 
same rate, or absorption of women has been faster when knowledge-intensive 
services has expanded more rapidly. This is an important test for my argu-
ment that women have disproportionately benefited from knowledge-
intensive services because they also disproportionately benefited from the ex-
pansion of tertiary education. This question is therefore put forward in H5.  
Finally, H6 reflects that portion of my argument which states that the public 
sector component of knowledge-intensive service employment has grown 
along with the expansion of tertiary education and that women have dispro-
portionately benefited from that expansion, both as providers of public edu-
cation as well as its beneficiaries.  
In order to test H5, I specify the following equation: 
KIS_FEMSHAREit = 0 + 1KISit + 2X’it + it        (7) 
where KIS_FEMSHAREit is a measure of the extent of feminisation of 
knowledge-intensive services while KISit is a measure of presence of 
knowledge-intensive services in country i at time t. Because the share em-
ployment in knowledge-intensive services is highly correlated with the share 
of women in knowledge-intensive services (the coefficient is above 0.90), I use 
alternative measures of knowledge-intensive services, such as the share of 
services in VA and the relative share of services to industry. This second 
measure is particularly important when I use GDP per capita as a control var-
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iable, since it makes my key independent and control variable less correlated. 
I do not include a quadratic specification of the independent variable because 
there is no theoretical reason to expect a quadratic relationship (the data also 
does not point to it). X’it is the vector of control variables, such as GDP per 
capita, it is an error term and the betas are the parameters to be estimated.  
Table 2, which shows the results of the econometric estimates, indicates that 
the share of services in VA, as a proxy for the expansion of knowledge-
intensive services, has had a significantly positive effect on the feminisation of 
knowledge-intensive services, both across and within the analysed coun-
tries.19 
 
Table 2. Share of services in VA and the share of women in knowledge-
intensive services: econometric estimates, all countries 1997-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE 
Services,  
VA 
0.946 0.399 0.810 0.262 
 (11.43)***   (5.86)***  (9.56)***  (5.17)*** 
GDP pc 
  1.039 0.267 
  (9.44)*** (9.43)*** 
_cons 
-14.723 19.178 -11.617 21.168 
(3.00)*** (4.53)*** (2.42)** (7.00)*** 
R2 0.45 0.27 0.57 0.63 
N 105 105 105 105 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Given the compelling strength of both cross-country and within country em-
pirical evidence, I conclude that women have disproportionately benefited 
from the creation of new knowledge-intensive service employment in Eastern 
Europe, so that feminisation of knowledge-intensive services was higher in 
                                                   19 The significantly positive coefficients are fully preserved at 1% significance when I use alterna-tive measures of the independent variable: the value of services vis-à-vis industry, the share of knowledge intensive services in the total working age population, and the share of knowledge- intensive services in total employment.  
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those countries where the expansion of the sector was more substantial. 
Therefore, I confirm H5. 
Before I move on to examining the impact of education on the relationship be-
tween FLFP and knowledge-intensive services, I disaggregate knowledge-
intensive service employment into its public and private sector components 
and analyse their respective contributions to FLFP in the region. This analysis 
has important implications for my theoretical framework, which suggests that 
countries with high FLFP have invested public resources into educational ex-
pansion, which has resulted in more jobs in the public and knowledge-
intensive sectors of the private economy. This argument is summarised in H6. 
It is a particularly important line of enquiry for this article because pro-
market reforms, which were implemented in Eastern Europe during post-
socialist transition, were aimed at the retrenchment of the state and reduction 
of public sector employment, processes which should have harmed women. 
In fact, resistance to public sector reform has been a highly politicised and sa-
lient issue in a number of transition countries (Kornai, Haggard & Kaufman, 
2001). Identifying public sector employment as an important driver of high 
FLFP in the Baltic region challenges the argument put forward by Bohle & 
Greskovits (2012) that the region has experienced the most neo-liberal reforms 
in Eastern Europe and a strong degree of social exclusion as a result of it.  
In order to test H6, I specify the following econometric model:  
FLFPit = i + PUBit + X’it + it               (8) 
where PUB is a measure of public sector employment in country i in year t, 
while the control variables include a measure of employment in the private 
sector, as well as economic complexity and GDP per capita.  
Table 3 shows the results of the econometric estimates of the relationship be-
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tween public sector employment as a share of the total working age popula-
tion and FLFP. This econometric analysis is conducted with the caveat that 
‘deeper’ causal mechanisms are driving the observed effect of public sector 
employment on FLFP, but I am still interested in finding out whether overall 
levels of public sector employment can predict FLFP rates.  
 
Table 3. Public sector employment and FLFP (15-64): econometric esti-
mates, all countries 1997-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE 
PUB pop 
1.064 0.441 0.953 0.470 0.877 0.661 
(11.34)*** (1.37) (7.72)*** (1.35) (6.11)*** (1.73)* 
PRIV_KIS 
pop 
0.276 0.278 0.475 0.240 0.304 0.540 
(2.40)** (1.06) (2.23)** (0.84) (1.54) (1.42) 
Economic  
complex   -1.607 0.219 -3.563 0.596 
   (2.82)*** (0.13) (3.51)*** (0.34) 
GDP pc 
    0.576 -0.504 
    (5.64)*** (1.19) 
_cons 
44.109 52.670 45.552 52.502 46.884 49.591 
(26.72)*** (15.36)*** (26.51)*** (14.65)*** (25.34)*** (11.45)*** 
R2 0.35 0.07 0.35 0.08 0.38 0.09 
N 123 123 120 120 120 120 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The positive effect of public sector employment on FLFP is significant both 
with and without FEs, while the effect of private sector employment is not. 
The positive and significant coefficients are preserved when a quadratic speci-
fication of economic complexity is included. Econometric analyses that in-
clude the share of public sector in total employment and the share of women 
in public sector employment as alternative specifications of the independent 
variable do not yield as strong predictions as the above analysis. This points 
to the importance of using the share of the working age population employed 
in a specific sector in order to understand a sector’s contribution to overall la-
bour force participation (because it is calculated as a share of economically ac-
tive individuals in the working age population). In summary, this analysis 
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points to a stronger contribution of public than private sector knowledge-
intensive service employment to FLFP in Eastern Europe. Therefore, it allows 
me to confirm H6. 
 
3.5 Knowledge-intensive services and educational expansion 
H7: Educational expansion amplifies the positive effect of knowledge-intensive ser-
vices on FLFP. 
If the positive effect of knowledge-intensive services growth on FLFP is am-
plified by educational expansion, women are able to benefit more from 
knowledge-intensive service employment in countries with higher overall 
educational attainment. Education is a more important factor for women than 
for men, I argue, because empirical evidence from Eastern Europe has shown 
that women have higher qualifications than men in the same category of jobs 
both in the public and in the private sector, possibly due to the higher barriers 
to labour market entry that they face (Avlijaš et al, 2013). Therefore, I include 
the interaction term between educational expansion and knowledge-intensive 
service employment into my analysis and estimate the marginal effects of 
knowledge-intensive service employment on FLFP at different levels of edu-
cational attainment.  
My empirical strategy to test H7 is summarised in the following econometric 
model: 
FLFPit = 0 + 1KISit + 2EDUit + 3KIS*EDUit + 4X’it + it      (9) 
where all the terms have already been defined in the previous sections. I op-
erationalise knowledge-intensive services as the share of knowledge-intensive 
service employment in the total working age population. I also show the re-
sults for public sector employment only, as an alternative specification of the 
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independent variable.20 I include both measures of educational expansion that 
I used in the previous sections, tertiary educational attainment and expendi-
tures on education as a share of GDP. I also include GDP per capita as a 
standard control variable with the same caveats that were mentioned in the 
previous sections.   
All of the estimates, with and without the FEs, produce a positive interaction 
coefficient, which is significant at 1% in all specifications (see Tables A-7 to A-
9 in the Appendix). I do not present the coefficients from the regressions in 
the article because when an interaction term is included, the coefficients of the 
original variables have very little meaning, i.e. they show the estimated slope 
when the independent variable takes on the value 0. Instead, I use marginal 
effect plots to show the estimated effect of knowledge-intensive services on 
FLFP at different levels of educational attainment and educational expendi-
tures. The marginal effect plots are shown for the PCSE OLS estimates in the 
graphs below. Graph 3 shows the effect of 1 percentage point increase in 
knowledge-intensive service employment on FLFP at different levels of edu-
cational attainment. The effect of knowledge-intensive service employment 
on FLFP is around 0.7 percentage points when tertiary educational attainment 
is 15% of the population (this is the average level of tertiary educational at-
tainment in my sample of countries, as shown in Table A-3 in the Appendix). 
While it is around 1.1pp when tertiary educational attainment is 25% and 
1.5pp when educational attainment is 35%. Furthermore, these marginal effect 
estimates are robust because the confidence intervals (vertical lines) do not 
overlap and all the points are significant and different from zero. 
 
 
                                                   20 I do not show the results with all the alternative specifications of the independent variable be-cause they produce very similar estimates. Instead, I focus on the results with the most important implications for this article. 
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Graph 3. Impact of interaction between knowledge-intensive service em-
ployment and educational attainment on FLFP (15-64): estimated marginal 
effects 2000-2008  
 
Note: ‘KIS_emp’	stands	for	knowledge-intensive service employment as a share of total working age population. 
 
The marginal effect plot of public sector employment on FLFP in Graph 4 
shows an even more pronounced impact of public sector employment on 
FLFP at higher levels of educational attainment. This finding indicates that 
when tertiary educational attainment is at 25% of the total population, a 1pp 
increase in public sector employment results in a 2pp increase in the overall 
FLFP. This means that at higher levels of tertiary educational attainment, pub-
lic sector jobs generate new private sector employment for women. While a 
more nuanced analysis would be required to understand the exact number 
and type of private sector jobs for women that an additional public sector job 
creates, this finding points to a strong multiplier effect of public sector em-
ployment on FLFP at higher levels of educational attainment. 
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Graph 4. Impact of interaction between public sector employment and edu-
cational attainment on FLFP (15-64): estimated marginal effects 2000-
2008  
 
Note: ‘SPUB_emp’	stands	 for	public	sector	employment	as	a	share	of	 total	working	age	popula-tion. 
 
Additionally, Graph A-4 in the Appendix shows the effect of knowledge-
intensive service employment on FLFP for the different levels of educational 
expenditures. A statistically-significant higher effect of knowledge-intensive 
service employment on FLFP is traced at higher levels of educational expendi-
ture as GDP per capita, and the effect doubles when educational expenditures 
increase from 4 to 6% of GDP. Finally, the effect of public sector employment 
on FLFP is also higher at higher levels of educational expenditures but this ef-
fect is also more pronounced than for total knowledge-intensive service em-
ployment (Graph A-5). Given the amplifying effect that educational expan-
sion proxies used in this analysis have on the relationship between 
knowledge-intensive service employment and FLFP, I find this evidence 
compelling enough to confirm H7. 
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3.6 Summary of the empirical analysis 
The presented empirical evidence supports the posited relationships between 
the variables for all seven hypotheses. I show robust evidence to support the 
claim that industrial upgrading leads to the defeminisation of manufacturing, 
both across and within the countries in my sample. Furthermore, within 
country FE estimates trace an inverse U-shaped relationship between eco-
nomic complexity and the share of women in manufacturing. This dynamic 
leads me to question whether this relationship could have been driven by the 
temporary access of Eastern European countries to female intensive low skill 
low wage jobs in footloose industries such as textiles and clothing, which 
would have moved to locations with cheaper labour once industrial upgrad-
ing pushed the wages up to a certain level.  
Furthermore, cross-country evidence on the negative impact of industrial up-
grading on FLFP is a lot more compelling than within country evidence on 
this relationship from the FE estimates, which is insignificant. Nevertheless, 
knowledge-intensive service employment, which is a control variable in this 
analysis, has a robust positive effect on FLFP in all of my estimates. I therefore 
argue that this strongly positive effect of knowledge-intensive services on 
FLFP might capture some of the overall negative effect of industrial upgrad-
ing on FLFP, as industrial upgrading is also posited to negatively affect FLFP 
by reducing the expansion of knowledge-intensive services. This argument 
also illuminates the weaknesses in using econometric estimates to trace com-
plex causal relationships between the variables of interest. 
For this reason, I also examine the relationships between industrial upgrading 
and educational expansion, as well as between educational expansion and the 
effect of knowledge-intensive services on FLFP, to determine whether indus-
trial upgrading could also be exercising its indirect effect on FLFP through 
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that causal mechanism. Empirical confirmation of these relationships 
strengthens my conclusion that industrial upgrading impedes the growth of 
FLFP in Eastern Europe.  
The cross-country evidence on the negative impact of industrial upgrading on 
educational expansion is compelling, while the within country evidence 
based on the FE estimates shows a U-shaped relationship between the two 
variables. I argue that this is the case because at higher levels of manufactur-
ing complexity, demand for specialised graduates grows and private provid-
ers start supplying higher education to fill this gap. Nevertheless, this type of 
expansion of tertiary education is not as beneficial for female employment as 
the state-led expansion of tertiary education, because it does not serve to ex-
pand general skills of the population.  
Furthermore, given the compelling strength of both cross-country and within 
country empirical evidence, I conclude that women have disproportionately 
benefited from the creation of new knowledge-intensive service employment 
in Eastern Europe, so that feminisation of knowledge-intensive services is 
higher in those countries where the expansion of the sector has been more 
substantial. I also show that public sector employment has a stronger effect on 
overall FLFP rates than private sector knowledge-intensive service employ-
ment. In the final section, I also confirm that educational expansion has an 
amplifying effect on the positive effect of knowledge-intensive service em-
ployment on FLFP, which is particularly pronounced in the case of public sec-
tor employment. 
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4. Conclusions 
This article begins by observing substantial variation in FLFP rates across 
post-socialist Eastern Europe. The observed divergence in FLFP trends during 
these countries’ transitions to capitalism is puzzling given the high economic 
participation of women during socialism. Literature has not attempted to ex-
plain this phenomenon because the common tendency has been to attribute 
socio-economic trends, which cannot be explained by existing western theo-
ries, to ‘the black box of transition’. The article therefore answers to the fol-
lowing question: Why were some Eastern European countries successful in 
reintegrating women into their labour markets during transition while others 
were not?  
The article posits a causal mechanism (depicted in Figure 1, section 2.1) 
through which different trajectories of economic restructuring in post-socialist 
Eastern Europe have led to different FLFP outcomes. It spells out the relation-
ship between industrial upgrading and expansion of knowledge-intensive 
services to FLFP and the role of a country’s skill regime in mitigating this rela-
tionship. This theoretical framework allows us to trace how countries can end 
up in a vicious cycle of low FLFP through the following causal mechanism: 
FDI-led industrial upgrading defeminises manufacturing employment be-
cause female labour-intensive sectors are not upgraded. Furthermore, the up-
grading absorbs the budgetary resources that could have been used for edu-
cational reform and general skills formation. This absence of educational re-
form in turn impedes the development of the knowledge economy and the 
service jobs associated with it, which are particularly absorbent of the female 
labour force and thus further reduces employment opportunities for women. 
Figure 1 also depicts how countries end up in a virtuous cycle of FLFP 
growth. Countries that do not succeed in pursuing re-industrialisation as their 
growth strategy turn to the reform of their skill regime by investing into ter-
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tiary education and expansion of general skills. This boosts public and private 
sector knowledge-intensive service employment as well as the share of wom-
en in it, creating a positive feedback loop for female labour market opportuni-
ties. 
While literature has investigated the role of specific sectoral changes on fe-
male employment within that particular sector, its tendency has been to ex-
amine one sector at a time. For example, topics of interest have been the im-
pact of trade liberalisation on female employment in developing countries 
(e.g. Gaddis & Pieters, 2012; Ghosh, 2001), or the role of service expansion on 
female economic opportunities in advanced capitalist economies (e.g. Nelson 
& Stephens, 2013). These processes have been commonly treated as inde-
pendent of one another and there have been no attempts that I am aware of to 
capture the dynamics of interaction between manufacturing and service em-
ployment. This dynamics of interaction between the different sectors of the 
economy is an especially salient topic for Eastern European countries which 
have been going through both the substantial restructuring of their economies 
as well as institutional reforms.  
Therefore, instead of treating FLFP as an automatic outcome of competitive 
economic forces, this article accounts for the role of the state in reinforcing 
female inclusion into the labour force. In that light, it challenges the Bohle & 
Greskovits (2012) classification of  the Baltic countries as ‘disembedded ne-
oliberal’ regimes and shows that instead, these countries have had a strong 
state commitment to social investment which also boosted female employ-
ment opportunities. These insights are in line with Nelson & Stephens (2013) 
who argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom about liberalisation, sub-
stantial public sector investment is needed in order to support growth of high 
productivity service jobs in an economy.  
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The theoretical framework presented in this article also allows us to think 
about the interactions between the various components of economic restruc-
turing and their impact on female economic opportunities in a dynamic and 
integrated fashion. It reflects systems thinking and accommodates a non-
linear notion of causality, both of which are being increasingly advocated by 
political economy and sociological literature (see Hall, 2006; Rodrik, 2015; 
Swedberg, 2014). Furthermore, my exploration of the role of social investment 
in the continually evolving and institutionally unstable Eastern Europe con-
tributes to the CPE literature that has only recently begun to take interest in 
social investment and the knowledge economy (Gingrich & Ansell, 2015; 
Thelen, 2014).  
Finally, the explanation presented in this article opens up room for new theo-
retical, empirical and normative research on what it means to achieve higher 
FLFP and what the trade-offs involved in it are. There is room for both hori-
zontal and vertical extensions of the theoretical framework. Its extensions to 
other emerging markets which depend on foreign sources of capital may pro-
duce novel insights. The explanation could be expanded to include other 
components of gender inequality in the labour market, including gender pay 
gaps, job quality and occupational segregation.  
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Appendix  
 
Graph A-1. FLFP (15-64) in CEE and Baltic (left panel) and SEE (right panel), 
1990-2010 
  
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: Trends for SEE are shown in a separate panel due to lack of analytical clarity when trends for all 13 countries are shown on a single graph. The range of values shown on the Y-axis is pur-posefully not the same on the two graphs. Equalisation of values on the Y-axis would have made it difficult to read the data off the graphs.    
Graph A-2. FLFP (15-64) in all countries, 2010 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table A-1. Exogenous variables 
Equation Exogenous variables (1) L = f1( K, )   contains other exogenous variables that affect the slope and the Y-intercept of the relationship between industrial upgrading and FLFP, so that a change in these exogenous variables can shift the curve and/or change the slope of the hypothesised relationship. This theoretical association between FLFP and industrial upgrading is determined by the extent of occupational segregation between the genders in industrial labour. A decrease in occupa-tional segregation in manufacturing, the equivalent of having more female employees in those industrial sectors that are dominated by men, would make this negative relationship between defeminisation of manufacturing and industrial upgrading more inelastic. would thus be less sensitive to changes in K. Moreover, a country that has historically had relatively more women in manufacturing (regardless of the level of occupational segrega-tion within manufacturing) would lose more female manufacturing labour as a result of industrial upgrading, ceteris paribus. This means that the Y-intercept would be smaller in those countries where fewer women work in manufacturing. Female reservation wages, which are a function of family policy (maternity 
and	 childcare	 benefits)	 and	 partner’s	 earnings,	 can	 also	 theoretically	 de-termine to what extent women are willing to work in manufacturing. Higher reservation wages would result in fewer female workers in manufacturing, ceteris paribus. I am assuming that the relationship between female em-ployment and their reservation wages is stronger for low-skill workers in manufacturing than for the highly-skilled workers in knowledge-intensive services. Prasad (2003), for example, suggests that highly-skilled workers are less tolerant of prolonged unemployment because they stand to lose more human capital investment by being unemployed. Following this line of argument, we may postulate that an increase of K would lead to a smaller negative effect on  in those countries where low skill women have higher reservation wages, i.e. the relationship between the two variables would be less elastic.  (2) L = f2( S, )   contains the exogenous variables that affect the relationship between FLFP and knowledge-intensive services. The types of knowledge-intensive service jobs that are created determine the gender composition of knowledge-intensive service employment. According to Walby (2011), the more centred these jobs are on fixed capital and technology, the more mas-culine they are, while the more centred on human capital they are, the more gender balanced. In other words, the more these knowledge-intensive ser-
vice	jobs	are	focused	on	workers’	skills	and	the	less	productive	they	are,	the more elastic is the relationship between knowledge-intensive services and FLFP. She also finds that the less centred the jobs are on fixed capital and technology, the less they are well paid. Another distinction within knowledge-intensive services is whether these jobs are generated in the public (e.g. in education and health services) or private sector (e.g. in IT, re-al estate or finance). Based on the findings by Ansell & Gingrich (2013), a larger share of public sector knowledge-intensive service jobs would have a stronger impact on the overall FLFP. Following Walby (2011), I also expect these public sector knowledge-intensive service jobs to be characterised by lower remuneration. (3) E = g( K, )  Exogenous variables, influencing the relationship between industrial up-grading and educational expansion, and represented by  in equation (3) are the following: 
Fiscal constraints. The more fiscally constrained a country is, the less public investment in education takes place, ceteris paribus, so the Y-intercept of the relationship between K and  is lower. This could be linked to that 
country’s	level	of	GDP	per	capita,	but	it	does	not	have	to	be,	since	different	countries have different social and political pressures on public expendi-
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ture, irrespective of their income levels. Fiscal constraints have been partic-ularly pertinent in Eastern Europe, due to the pressure of global tax compe-tition to attract foreign capital as well as the constraint imposed by the pro-cess of EU integration. 
Dependence on foreign capital for innovation. The more dependent the coun-try is on foreign capital for innovation, the more elastic is the inverse rela-tionship between K and . This is because the country that is dependent on MNCs for innovation will focus on preserving that source of innovation ra-ther than invest in general skills-oriented education and R&D. Furthermore, the MNCs are also keen to keep the taxes low, which fiscally constrain the host country and does not allow it to invest in educational expansion. 
Institutional and political factors may also stall the ability of a country to re-form and adapt its educational system to structural change. Such factors are 
the	 strength	 of	 teachers’	 unions	 and	 their	 resistance	 to	 reform	 (Padure,	
2009)	as	well	as	 the	 institutional	 flexibility	of	a	country’s	educational	and	training	 system.	The	 flexibility	 of	 a	 country’s	 training	 system	depends	 on	whether skills are acquired through firms and on-the-job training or through the public sector. According to Anderson & Hassel (2008), firm-based skill regimes, like the skill regime in Germany, have been slower to respond to the needs of the rising service economy than school-based training regimes, as seen in the Netherlands.  (4) S = h( E, )  I have identified three exogenous variables represented by  that can af-fect the relationship between educational expansion and knowledge-intensive services. One	is	the	level	of	a	country’s	economic	openness	and	its	exposure to foreign investment. Educational expansion can translate into private sector knowledge-intensive service jobs to the extent that there is an international (and domestic) market that requires these skills. The more a country is integrated with the global economy and global knowledge sup-ply chains, and the more tradable are the services it produces, the more ed-ucational expansion can translate into knowledge-intensive service jobs.  The second factor that shapes this relationship between  and  is invest-ment in ICT, since it is a key tool through which knowledge can be managed inside organisations as well as in the market (Jalava & Pohjola, 2002) and a key reason for the growth of productivity in the service economy (Wren, Fodor & Theodoropoulou, 2013). The more a country invests in ICT, the more we can expect educational expansion towards general skills to trans-late into the expansion of knowledge-intensive service jobs. 
The	 third	 factor	 is	 the	 financing	 structure	 of	a	 country’s	 system	of	 higher	education, as observed by Ansell & Gingrich (2013). A mass publicly pro-vided tertiary education, such in Scandinavia, can be expected to increase public service knowledge-intensive service jobs, while a partially private financing structure is expected to generate more jobs in the private knowledge-intensive service sectors, such as finance and real estate.  
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Table A-2. Eurostat classification of knowledge-intensive services (NACE 
Rev.2 codes – 2-digit level between brackets) 
High-tech knowledge-intensive services: 
• Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music pub-lishing activities (59); 
• Programming and broadcasting activities (60); 
• Telecommunications (61); 
• Computer programming, consultancy and related activities (62); 
• Information service activities (63); 
• Scientific research and development (72) 
Knowledge-intensive market services (excluding financial intermediation and high-tech 
services): 
• Water transport (50); 
• Air transport (51); 
• Legal and accounting activities (69); 
• Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities (70); 
• Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis (71); 
• Advertising and market research (73); 
• Other professional, scientific and technical activities (74); 
• Employment activities (78); 
• Security and investigation activities (80) 
Knowledge-intensive financial services: 
• Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding (64); 
• Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security (65); 
• Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities (66) 
Other knowledge-intensive services: 
• Publishing activities (58); 
• Veterinary activities (75); 
• Public administration and defence; compulsory social security (84); 
• Education (85); 
• Human health activities (86); 
• Residential care activities (87); 
• Social work activities without accommodation (88); 
• Creative, arts and entertainment activities (90); 
• Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities (91); 
• Gambling and betting activities (92); Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities (93)  Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Knowledge-intensive_services_(KIS) 
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Table A-3. Descriptive statistics, 1997-2008   Obs. Mean SD Min      1st Q Median      3rd Q Max 
D femshare 123 42.17 5.16 33.09 38.28 40.92 47.32 53.01 
E. complex 146 0.85 0.49 -0.23 0.55 0.79 1.31 1.65 
E. complex2 146 0.96 0.84 0.00 0.30 0.62 1.72 2.73 
KIS femshare 105 43.95 8.01 22.67 41.24 46.66 49.8 54.01 
KIS emp 123 36.98 5.36 21.22 35.63 38.05 40.77 45.48 
KIS pop 123 22.02 4.12 12.42 18.97 22.61 24.74 31.09 
PUB femshare 119 65.17 5.24 47.77 62.86 65.98 67.86 75.12 
PUB emp 123 23.18 3.17 13.37 21.79 23.72 25.43 28.26 
PUB pop 12 13.77 2.31 8.71 11.95 14.21 15.45 18.14 
Edtert total 100 15.29      5.58       7.50 11.20 14.05 18.05 35.30 
Edtert female 100 17.07 7.40  6.80 10.95 15.50 21.65 39.80 
Ed. exp. 121   4.74 0.87  2.65   4.02   4.79   5.43   7.22 
Note: Label	‘femshare’	refers	to	share	of	women	in	that	sector,	label	‘emp’	refers	to	share	of	that	
sector	in	total	employment	and	label	‘pop’	refers	to	the	share	of	that	sector	in	the	total	popula-tion. 
 
 
Table A-4. Economic complexity and share of women in manufacturing: 
econometric estimates, all countries 1997-2008  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE 
Economic 
complex 
-7.668 -1.896 -6.924 1.734 -7.744 5.306 -7.527 6.975 (6.54)*** (1.63) (7.99)*** (1.28) (4.10)*** (2.35)** (3.91)*** (3.23)*** 
Economic 
complex2 
    0.042 -5.074 0.352 -4.038     (0.07) (3.65)*** (0.46) (3.03)*** 
GDP pc 
  -0.182 -0.870   -0.191 -0.752   (1.47) (4.41)***   (1.45) (3.88)*** 
_cons 
49.473 44.127 49.721 45.235 49.499 42.841 49.952 44.062 (44.41)*** (40.66)*** (40.22)*** (43.81)*** (38.41)*** (39.46)*** (31.38)*** (41.30)*** 
R2 0.47 0.02 0.48 0.18 0.47 0.13 0.48 0.24 
N 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A-5. Economic complexity and population with tertiary education: 
econometric estimates, all countries 2000-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE 
Economic  
complex 
-4.291 2.169 -10.812 -3.933 1.203 -9.659 -1.558 -13.384 (4.37)*** (1.12) (8.53)*** (2.21)** (0.25) (2.55)** (0.42) (4.36)*** 
Economic  
complex2 
    -2.980 8.263 -5.307 6.832     (1.39) (3.56)*** (3.27)*** (3.66)*** 
GDP pc 
  1.495 1.756   1.616 1.662   (14.47)*** (6.99)***   (17.17)*** (7.03)*** 
_cons 
19.320 13.245 17.353 9.473 17.383 15.414 13.744 11.469 (16.16)*** (7.25)*** (13.28)*** (6.06)*** (8.14)*** (8.46)*** (8.14)*** (7.35)*** 
R2 0.12 0.01 0.35 0.37 0.13 0.14 0.39 0.46 
N 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table A-6. Economic complexity and educational expenditures: economet-
ric estimates, all countries 1997-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE PCSE FE  
Economic  
complex 
-0.146 -0.532 -1.001 0.111 -0.080 -1.905 -0.353 -1.407  (0.69) (1.77)* (3.85)*** (0.32) (0.08) (3.09)*** (0.37) (2.36)**  
Economic  
complex2 
    -0.036 1.006 -0.371 1.154      (0.08) (2.54)** (0.81) (3.07)***  
GDP pc 
  0.210 -0.167   0.219 -0.182    (5.46)*** (3.37)***   (5.75)*** (3.80)***  
_cons 
4.876 5.231 4.594 5.487 4.853 5.445 4.342 5.756  (22.87)*** (18.75)*** (22.19)*** (19.80)*** (10.13)*** (19.11)*** (9.51)*** (20.50)***  
R2 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.19  
N 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A-7. Interactive effect of knowledge-intensive service employment 
and educational attainment on FLFP (15-64): econometric estimates, all 
countries 1997-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE 
KIS pop 
0.107 -1.124 -0.017 -0.837 (1.24) (3.04)*** (0.18) (1.94)* 
Edtert  
total 
-0.740 -1.546 -0.733 -1.506 (7.43)*** (4.18)*** (6.71)*** (4.07)*** 
KIS pop*  
Edtert total 
0.039 0.073 0.040 0.072 (10.32)*** (4.42)*** (10.65)*** (4.36)*** 
GDP pc 
  0.237 -0.539   (4.01)*** (1.27) 
_cons 
56.230 83.811 57.174 80.108 (26.09)*** (10.90)*** (26.96)*** (9.77)*** 
R2 0.52 0.28 0.53 0.30 
N 97 97 97 97  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table A-8. Interactive effect of knowledge-intensive service employment 
and educational expenditures on FLFP (15-64): econometric estimates, all 
countries 1997-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE 
KIS pop 
-1.181 -1.631 -1.234 -1.446 (3.62)*** (3.22)*** (3.98)*** (2.36)** 
Ed. exp. 
 
-9.361 -9.807 -9.532 -9.504 (5.68)*** (4.11)*** (5.91)*** (3.86)*** 
KIS pop*  
Ed. exp. 
0.422 0.435 0.430 0.418 (5.84)*** (4.29)*** (6.12)*** (3.94)*** 
GDP pc 
  0.054 -0.209   (0.94) (0.54) 
_cons 
86.662 97.587 87.513 94.827 (12.16)*** (8.21)*** (12.72)*** (7.31)*** 
R2 0.37 0.28 0.37 0.28 
N 107 107 107 107  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A-9. Interactive effect of public sector employment and educational 
attainment on FLFP (15-64): econometric estimates, all countries 1997-
2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PCSE FE PCSE FE 
PUB pop 
-0.043 -0.953 -0.390 -0.713 (0.21) (1.57) (2.07)** (1.06) 
Edtert  
total 
-1.315 -1.582 -1.409 -1.528 (6.69)*** (3.59)*** (7.57)*** (3.43)*** 
PUB pop*  
Edtert total 
0.097 0.106 0.106 0.104 (7.50)*** (3.70)*** (9.04)*** (3.61)*** 
GDP pc 
  0.345 -0.266   (10.92)*** (0.85) 
_cons 
60.328 75.068 62.739 72.784 (19.85)*** (8.87)*** (22.71)*** (8.18)*** 
R2 0.56 0.28 0.58 0.29 
N 97 97 97 97  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Graph A-3. Impact of interaction between knowledge-intensive service em-
ployment and educational expenditures on FLFP (15-64): estimated mar-
ginal effects 1997-2008  
 
Note: ‘KIS_emp’	stands	for	knowledge-intensive service employment as a share of total working age population. 
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Graph A-4. Impact of interaction between public sector employment and 
educational expenditures on FLFP (15-64): estimated marginal effects 
1997-2008  
 
Note: ‘SPUB_emp’	stands	 for	public	sector	employment	as	a	share	of	 total	working	age	popula-tion. 
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